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THE CONTRACT OF SUO1 RIPTION TO C ORORAT' STOCK.
If one.shlould contevlate ti iJ-prtance and te extent
of the mWcject of the ontr.act of suftscrittiorn to corlorate
stock, and the vast mass of adjudication that has necessarily
resulted from a consideration of its ;rL-cii4es, it will not
appear apparent what is tht precise scope and intent of this
paper.
For antiaipatin the ,-any and varied relvtions arising
out of the contract from ths time of the conception to the
time of its termination, with t1 cornseuont rights and liar
bilities attendant thereon, together wit'a the ambiguous and
oftimes irreconcilable, attitudes of the different courts to-
ward what they deem a proper construction, it is obvious that
the subject can not here be treated in its entirety but it is
rather intended to presentthe recognized nature and form of
the contract of subscription and what is bloiovod to be the
precise and imiediate relation the sfoscriber assumes from
?is formal act of affixing his sign.turo to the subscriltion
paper. A discussion of those topics which relate to sub-
scriptions upon conditions recedent and rpon slecial terms,
the various p*hases and effects of fraud uion the contract, and
the grolds that-will justify recission: all of which are
properly within the scole of a broader review of the subject,
will not be here attompted. A reference will be made to
them only so far as it nqay seen necessary to a proper dis-
cussion of the subjeat more immediately under consideration
and as we have indicated above.
The existence of a corporation was not recog~izoL by the
co .an law of EnFland. The privilege of chartering a number
of indoviduals to act in a corporate caraoity ?ras construed
to be the valuable and exclusive prerogative of the Crown, and
later of Parliament -. All astociations of individuals or-
ganizod for corporate purposes and assmiin.g to act rithout
the sanction of express authority from the state were deemed
to have usurped f rctions which they could not lawfully exer-
cise: their acts and contracts made in furtherance of the
common object were held void and unenforceable.
It is manifest A that the contract of subscription to
the stock of a corporation is the creature of the statute
alone. The rights and liabilities of the subscriber and
his relation to his fellow shareholders, to creditors and
to the state must derend upon the construction placed upon
the statute *nder which the sifoscriition was taken, for
that alone can finally detemine the legality and extent of
his contract. No rt~hts can be acquired by resorting to the
aomwn law theory of contracts and no liabilities can tihus be
ifietrred. The prtnciples of the aom-on lwT, 'an adherence to
which are necessary to the efficacy and enforeeability of
ordinary contracts, have no appllcation to the contract of
subsaription to the stock of a corporation. No technical
requirements of the comon law need be here observed and re-
ference need be had only to the governing statute as to the
final repository of the requIrments of a legal undertaking.
Perhaps the best. exmple of the imbecility of the eommnon law
In relation to a binding contract of subscription Is the ab-
andonment of the neeerrity of a oo~nzder ttcr,. This element
so essential to the enforceability of n r-y c-nact is
of no necessary consequence here. But while all the above
Is true, It may be -said, that any element which In the: nature
of things is essentially a factor in every contract exists
here as well as elsewhere, As such may be mentioned the
necessity of competent parties and of rmltual assent. Without
the incorperation of those elements no true contract would
be possible.
Having thus sustained the conlusion that the statute
foms the basis of all accruing rirhts &xid liabilitiAes a very
brief statement of the methods and form that will suserve a
valid and binding subscription will suffice for the pimPoses
of this paper. If the statute prescribes no ctLaular form
of subscription and designates no exlpross mode of entering
into the contract, the general rules of law aplicable to the
creation of a binding obligation under like ciraumstances
will here apply. No formalities are deemed necessary and
any act which in the eyes of the law signifies an intention
to become a shareholder will, if such act in favorably con-
sidered by the co manybind the subscriber and the corpor-
ation alike. It Is well settled that one *iay be a share-
holder de facto in a corporate body although the manner of
his subscription may have been defective and even though there
may have bean no subscription at. all. If he assugmes to act
and in fact does act as a constituted maerber of a corporate
association leading sub-,scribers to invest and speculate on
the faith of his alliance and creditors to extend credit to
the corporation on the proscrivtion of that o:uoitLon, any sub-
sequent attempnt of his to withdra7' or to stifle his liability
on the plea of am incoraplete subscription will be confronted
by the objection of an equitable estop;31.
But when the statute presimaos tp prescribe a mothod of
subsoriptioa the legislative enactment auwst be scruprously
observed in its partioulars. Yet a substantial compliance
will satisfy the law. A failure to Ooraly with a technical
and trivial demand of the statute will not afford sufflioOnt
ground to avoid the binding force of a subscription valid on
other grimds. But a substantial departure from the rule of
the statute will, engender a void ard useless contract that
can give rise to no rights or a corresponding liability., For
instance, if the statute should require each subscriber to
sign articles of association, a mere signing of the-prelifr-
inary subscription, paper would not constitute the subscriber'
a stooMolder or render him liable for any of the corporate
obligat, tOn .
A,,:u ;.,ivo and interesting question but one which will
probably not cause a wide divergence among the authorities
when the question is fairly presented and necessarily involved
in a given decision, is that occasioned by the inquiry whether
a parel subscriptlon to the stoc. of a coporation is a valid
and binding obligation. To venture a plausible estimate of
what the unani ious conclusion shold be will necessitate a
brief reference to the contract in its relation to the coznon
law and to the Statuto of Fralds. it ima ba said that so
far as the) qtcostion has bo:n directll adJudicatod th-e con-
alusions have been u-nanimous in favor of the validity and
binding force of a parol subscrlVption. Such we find was the
ruling in the oft citeod case of Colfax 1otcl Co, v Lyon, 19
N. W. 780 (Ky.) followed and supported by,
Bullock v Falmouth, 5 S. W. 120 (!iy.)
Cookney's Case, Z De G. & 1. 170.
In the work of Tho pon on "Liability of Stockholders,"
we are confronted by the remark that parol subscriptions are
not Conducive to a binding contract and eitei o following
eases in su'dozt of hia contention:-
R. R. Co. v Gazzam, 32 Pa. St. 340.
Vreeland v Stone Co. 20 N. F. Eq. 188.
Timnel v Sheldon, 6 Barn. & C. 541.
Hotel v Bolton, 46 Tex. 633.
and the later ease,:. of Fanning v Ins. Co., 37 Ohio St. 39
is cited by another text writer in support of the same view.
But none of these cases justify the conclusion advanced,
it will be odserved upon an investigati n of thOese authorities
that in every case the decision of the court involved to a
more or less degree the construction of a statute in its re-
lation to the perol agreomwo':t. In no, one of 1he cases last
referrod to did the court essay to hold that a -arol contract
of subecrilption, relioved from the mandatory requirements of
a statute, was unenforceableAnd there would som to be no
legitimate reason for a difference of opinion upon this in-
quiry. There is nothir:c In the natu.re of the contract which
should require a construction that a writing is necessary in
order to induce a binding obligation, any more than such an
interpretation is necessary in construing ordinary contracts.
A eorporation, for the purpose of effecting Its organization
and- for the purpose of exercising its appropriate functions
as a corporate body, shouldhave as comprehensive a power in-
eldent thereto as any natural individual requires for the
proper conduct of a private enterprise. Ax'ong these leg-
itimate functions is the privilege of disposing of its capital
stook by a parol subscription and have it regarded as an en-
forceable agreement.
The relation of the contract of subscription to the
Statut& of Frauds while not so apparent on its face will
probably occasion no greater amount of dispuzte. There are
two provisions of the statute with which the contract is said
to be in conflict and it is i.rith reference to these provisions
that we will now direct our inquiry. Let us suppose, for
illustration, that one agrees to subscribe for the stook of
a Oorporation when it shall be formed. When the subscriber
is sued for the amount of his subscription may he plead the
statute as a defense, relying especially on the provision
which renders all contracts not to be perforued within a year
void and umenforceable unless in writing ? There would seem
to be no substantial grotmd for holding that he has this
right:for by a long line of cases, too numerous to admit of
a question, the rule has been established that where the con-
tract could in the pommible course of events be performed
within a year it is not within the. operation of the statute
althoEugh as a matter of fact it may not have been performed
within that time.
But there is, however, an inquiry involving the nature
of the contract and the operation of the statute, which does
not so easily admit of an answer. If one should subscribe
by parol to the stock of a corporation for ar amount exceed-
ing fifty (50) dollars would his contract be imenforceable
under the Vrovisions of the statute which renders void all
*agreements for the sale of goodsfor the value of fifty (go)
dollars or more" unless in writing ? The stock of a corpor-
ation is a chose in action and as such r i Ijuct to a valid
sale. Thus it would be only natural to hold as an obvious
necessity that, the Iarol agreemont could not be enforced.
But the acceptod doctrine would son to be otherwise.
The construction by wh-ich tais conclusion is attained is based
on the reasonire that in an original s~bscription the corjor-
ation has no present stcck which can be the subject of a sale.
The subscription agreement itself is the instrizriont by which
the stock is primarily created: it is thus, according to this
view, a creation of stock and not a sale, thereby being re-
lieved from the provisions of t7;e statute. A distiiction
between stock once iso-eod and then mfojected to a sale and
stock created by the original subscrip1tio is the inevitable
consequence necessarily of an adherence to this doctrine.
Holding, as they do, that a sale of tho former must comply,
with the statute and the 'mdertaking embodied in a writing,
while in the latter intance rtccI nay -as from the corpor-
ation t6 the suhscriber as a consirhation for his :wbsci t-
ion and yet the transaction rGEt bdyond tho palc of the stat-
utory enactment. Such a construction obviously subordinates
the clear and definite p'urpcse of the ptatute of Frauds to
the necessities of a barren tech 4e7a,.AL
.'..Taking leave now of the discussion of these well estab-
liphed and for the most part undispute. jprineii les of .oor-
poration law re enter upon a field of investigation only to
be confronted by the many contradictions and distilnction of
Court adjudications. and text writin,: which have tendiod to
confuse rather than enlighton the present state of judicial
chaos. There is no more important question Athan that atten-
dent upon a consideration of a subecriber's liability on his-
subscription before the organization of the corporation. And
it will be the purpose of this paper to now extract, if pos-
sible, from the vast mass of authority the true status of a
subscriber so situated with his rights and liabi*ti7es. To
forrmlate our question:- what is the undertaking of one Who
subscribes for the stoaX of ,a corporation not yot in being but
to be incorporated in the future ?
In view of the uncertainty and confusion which would
otherwise follow it would seem best to state, what is believed
to be, the established rules and then ondeavor to sustain
them, by competent authority. In compliance iherefore the
conelusion is ventured t~iat in a 'pure orthodox wabscription
before incorporation, as distinguished from an agrement to
xubscrlbe, the transaction is in the nature of a continuing
offer to become a shareholder In the prospective corporation,
w)Idh offer is made to the corporation and can in no sense be
regarded as a binding contract. existing between the several
subscribers; and further that the offer .iay be accepted by the.
properly constituted agents of the corporation which accept-
anee will transform it inlto a binding and irrevocable agree-
ment, but that at any time before a due acceptance the sub-
scriber may revoke and withdraw the offer, thereby divesting
himself of all rights in the rrospecotive corporation and re-
lieve him from all suIbsequaent possible liability. Excluding
the last element as to the power of revocation it is believe&
there is no judicial decision now extan:, which in given the
ereditof being responsible authority and where the question
was directly adjudicated, in which the propositions as 1,id
down are denied. But it here to be observed .again that re-
ference is had only to a m- iat toi and simgl"
41s8ti uished from an. aLrobzont too subscribe whidh some courts
have construed to be quite a different underteahing.
But the soundness of the above proposition-s would not
seem apparent upon a casual reading of the cases and text
books, and indeed it can only be adLmitted that the contrary
would seem well established, in some jilpdica&ons at least.
A most careful and laborious scrutinizing of the cases is
essential in order to discern the true status of af'fairc, but
it is believed such an invoti~sation v:ill beer out and Sup-
port the above propozitions. The main source of confusion
would seem to be in the distinatin drawn by a considerable
nmber of the courts between a present su'czcription and an
agreement to bsc'ribe, but this will be considered presently.
While not attempting to analyze all the aparently
hostile statements of various authorities it will be profit-
able to refer to one erroneous conclusion of a text writer so
offoqn misleading because of 'he unblushing character of the
assertion. Cook in Vol. 1. of his work on "Stockholders ad
Corporation Law" after developing and sustaining the prin-
ciple that a subscription is a ncro offer to the prospective
eorporation and not an agroemont among the several subscribers.
informs us that a contrary rule prevails in New York and
cites the case of Lake Ontario Shore R.R. v Cittiss, aC N.Y.
219 as authority.
,Put an exarpdinatlon of that case viU. not justify the
remark. In the first :lace tho contract broaht to the
attention of the court resolvd itsclf into an agrcci:ont to
subscribe and was in no sense a present suioscri- .ion. In
the second place the decision of the court rested upon the
fact that the sbscri-1ton was made upon a condition preced-
ent wbich condition had not been performed; and all that was
said by the learned judgc vho delivered the opinion not bear-
ing on the precie point in issue was not :;t1, adjudged
sentiment of the court but nere dicta.
And the rule as laid down should commend itxelf to a
careful and considerate judgment for it is based on conclus-
ions fundamental and natural. The pritlary scope and fun-
etion of a subscription to the stock of a corporation is an
offer to become a shareholder on consideration of the com-
pany extending the benefits and privileges resulting from
such a situation. It is primarily an offer to the corpor -
ation intended to be accepted by the corporation. It is not
the pin pose of the agreemnent to obligate one subscriber- to
another and is not i-ade to oporate between them. Mile it
is true the subscription of one is often, and perhaps always,
the sole inducement and consideration for the agroement of
the others yet this alone i not sutficient competent, evi-
dence to establish a mocting 'f the 41inds. Such a procedure
is merely a riothod of bringing the partios together. They
intend to deal with the aor 3oration anrl bind themselves to it
alone. The corporation accepts or rejects the offer at its
will regardless of the provisions of the prior agreement
wmong the Individual subscribers; aid if accepted the OomPan
convoys the stock acting in its own corporate caacitynot in
the pirsuance, prirarily,of the original indertaklng of the
several subscribers but in accordance with the tens of the
new contract initiated by. its own acceptance.
The trnie, soixnd and logical doctrine was wiell eniunciated
in the leading case of Athal :-usic Hall Co. v Carey, 11G Mass.
at page 470 in which Wells, J. said:- "In agreements of this
nature entered into before the organization is formed or the
agents constituted to receive the amount subscribed, the dif-
fieulty is to ascertain the xroniisoe in whose naame alone suit
can be brought. The romise of each su scrlber to and with
each other is not a contract capablc of being enforced or in-
tended to operate literally as a contract to be enforoeo be-
tween each subzcriber and each othcr rho may have signed pre-
vlously, or who would sign afterwards, nor between each other
and a3Jl the others collectively as individu.11als. The under-
ta ing is inchoate and incomnjletc as a contract until the
eomtemplated organization is offected or the mutual agent
constituted to represent the association of individual rights
I is
in aeeeptinS and acting upon the propositions offered by the
several subscriptions. vmen thus accepted the promise maY
be construed to have legal effect according to its Ipurpose
and intent and the practical necessity of the case: to wit,
as a contract with the common representitive of the several
associations ......... Although his promise (referring to the
ease at bar) was originally voluntary or in the nature of a
mere open pproosition, yet having been accolted and acted on
by the party authorized to do so, before he attcmpted to re-
tract it, he has lost his right to revoke. His promise has
become an accepted mutual contract and is bindlft upon hil as
well as upon the corporation. "i
It- then being clear that in a present subscrijtion the
subscriber's rights procod from the corporation and his lia-
bility, if any exist, is to that body only and that the re-
misning subscribers have no resource whatever upon his under-
taking, we now grapp~le with a more difficult proposition.
Various coirts while conceding and sustaining the proposition
heretofore considered refuse to apply the same construction
to a mere agreement to subscribe a'ong the different prozais-
ors. It is here contended that no proposition is riade to
the corporation, that imo liability to that body can arise
therefrom and that if any responsibility is indued by the
eontract at all it exists on behalf of the remaining stb-
seribers.
The doctrine contonded for is best stated by Morawetz in
his excellent work on "Privato Corporations" Vol. I where we
fifn the following:- "A different case is presented where the
parties mutually agree to subscribe for shares in a corpor-
ation to be formed thereafter. Here there is no uneondit-
ional agreement to become a shareholder as soon as the cor-
poration shall be forned, but it is contemplated. that the
parties shall themselves perform an additional act. before be-
eoming shareholders; 'namely, execute the statutory contract
of mevbership by' subscription upon the stock books. It is
plain therefore that in this case there is no. offer whieh the
corporation can accept and the parties do not become share-
holders and cannot be charged as such unless they subsoqaently
carry out their agreement by subscribing for the shates."
In the illustrative case of Strasblurg R.R.Co. v Echter-
nachlt, 21. Pa. St. 220 wle find perhaps, the first and leading
exposition of the foregoing position. Chief Justice Black
in delivering the opinion of the court Save vent to the fol-
lowing remarks which are the accepted authority of those who
sustain this view and ditinction'- "A contract cannot be
mate by one person alone. It takes two to rnalle a bargain.
Before a yromise bocomes a binding oblif,aticn it must not only
be made to, but iust be oxp",:;ly or ir'!1iodly accerted by,
the party for whose benefit it was noant. The paper before
us was no more than a nahzed expression of the subscriber's
intention to purchase certain shares in the capital stoet of
a eomr-ay which it was expected would be incorporated by the
legislature. Besidee it is without any sufficient consider-
ation. Again if there was a binding engagement it was not
I
made with the Railroad Company which did not exist at the tim
Again in the oft cited case of Thrasher v Pike Co. R.R.
Co, reported in 25 Ill. 340 the court said:- 'it is claimed
by the Vlaintiffs that they are entitled to recover as dean-
ages the par value of the stock. This, we do not think, is
a fair view of the defendeat's liability on his _,zromise. His
undertaking is to subscribe a certain xuaowt of stock when
the subseription boohks shouild be opened. This promise loes
not 'make him a stockholder and as such liable for calls. The
eompany has parted with no. stock to him and can only alaim
as lamages the actual loss sustained by them by his failure
or refusal to subscribe whon he was 'notified.11 This case
was considered and aproved in
Quick v Letaon, 105 Ill. 585.
It. Sterling Coal-roar- Co. v Little, 14 :ush 429 C 14.)
These authorities wouleL seem to have an acecrate eompre-
hension of the true nature of the agreonont to subscribe but
in applying the law in the character of a rnedy, fundamental
and natural maxims of jurisprudence are lost sight of. It is
nnloubtedly true that the immediate contractual relations
exist between the several subscribers and that the agreement
is not a promise made to the oorporation as a direct prop-
osition. The relation resulting is that of a good contract
In which the promise of one is a sufficient consideration for
the undertaking of each and every other. Such is, or at
least should be, undoubted law.
But while it is true the original agreement. is not made
with the corporation, which indeed may not then be in exis-
tence, it is clearly obvious the intent of the parties is
that the contract shall inure te the benefit of the proposed
corporation. That is the precise scope and meaning of the
undertaking and is manifestly the only construction which its
terms can justify. Now it is a universally recognized rule
of simple contract that where two or more individruals jointly
enter into a contract for the bonof'it of a third person, this
beneficiary may maintain a.n action upon the agreement without
the necessity of incoranatinr ay '.itional consideration.
There is no sufficient reason 'ahy thr rule cannot be a7lied
in an action by a corporation to onforcic the socif per-
formanee of an agreament to zubscribe. And such aijears tO
be the better rule sw-orte.! by the ,most corrpotent authority.
In the case of Hotel Co. v Giit i, 15 .o. Ap-. 7v14 the
law was well stated by D2]kewell, J, in the following remarks:-
"It is a rule of simle contract that if one person makes a
promise to another, for the benefit of a third, the thirt may
maintain an action npon it. though the con-iderat ion does not
move from him. The mutual promiises of the several subscribers
in this case constitute a sufficient consideration, and that
*he promise to pay a third party is not a tenable objection,
and te promise is binding thougt'h the corporation to which
payment is to be nade is not then in esso but to be formed
thereafter."
Thus it would apy-ear the courts were tending torard the
eonstruction that a corporation may sustain an action to com-
pell the specific performance of an agro.ient to subscribe as
the beneficiary of an exoc,.tory contract. Prior to its or-
ganIsation the undertaking is priuarily one between the intl-
vidual subscribers, but on acceptanae by the company the sub-
seribor is constitutol a qualfiod sharoholder, is relieved
of his obligation to the remaining subscribers as such, and
his original contract becomes merged in the one with the cor-
poration, which is now so situated as to be able to coMpel a
fulfillment of the promise.
A case well illustrating the extreme frailty of the dis-
tinetion between a present subscriptt io agn an agreement to
subscribe is Tin Creeo Road Co. v Lancaster, 79 Ky. 552 fro
whieh we extract the following brief remark of Pryor J, :-
"The contract in this case, it is true, is made with individ-
ual subscribers and not with the eorporatlon.'....but the oney
due is for the corporation, and the promise is to pay the
corporation: and the consideration is the mutual a&reement
between these parties to form the ecrporation an ,build the
road, and when the corporation was created the tefendents
were bound by their subscription.;.
The three cases previously ref erred to: naxnely 25 111.340j
105 Il' 505; and 14 B1ish 429 seem to lay Great stress upon
the fact, as they claim, that th:o orporation has parted with
no stock to the subscriber which will -r.port an action for
srpeelfie performance. But a sufficient answer to this WP I&1
seem to be that 0te issuance of a certifieate of stock is
never necessary to constitute one a shareholfer; Indeed, the
eirtificate is only evidence of hin right. The mere aecept-
anee by the eorporation is enoug -h. to create the relation of a
stoekholder and will bind the eomany and the subscriber
alike.
The attitude of New York in regard to this question is
deemed by many to still be equivocal and unsettled ant the
ease of Lake Ontario Shore R.R. v CizrtlsE, sirpra, is frequent-
ly eited as being in aeoard with the view that sustains the.
distinction and 4enio* the righrt of the corporation to spe-
eifically enforce the arroonent to subscribe. But the posit-
ion of the New York courts cannot be said to be in doubt and
Lake Gntario R.R. v Curtisss cannot be regardet as authority
to smport the eontention aivancel. It is true that in that
eAse the court refused to enforce an agr(ernent to suocribe,
on behalf of a corporation, an it is further td be a mittet
that the dicta of the learned jndge who feliverel the opinion
of the cnorte aertainly sustains the distinction we are #is-
assin . But the case is easily distinguishable.
In the first instance the subscriber's agreerent was one
upon condition precedent which condition had not teen 1erformea
as stipulated. And t1is element was all the decision of the
court essayed to determine. They denied the right to spe-
elflc performqace upon the one ground that the terms of the
agreement had not bu~en corTied with. But Danforth,;. in
his opinion advanced farther than a necessary discussion of
the decision required and gave birth to the remarks which
have given rise to a disproportionato waount of confusion and
mis-interpretation. The learned Judge submits himself to
the fmailiar error that the corporation not being a party to
the original agreeaent cannot invoke the assistance of the
court to coinpell specific 'erforaance; a fallacy which, it is
hoped, has been made apparent by the foregoing consideration
of the question.
The case of Lake Ontario Shore R.R. v Curtiss was con-
sidered in the later decision of Buffalo and Jamestown R.R.Co.
v Gifford, 37 N.Y. 2)4 in which the court interlreted the.
Curtiss case as deciding only that the corporation was not
entitled to specific perforimance while the conditions of the
subscriber's agreement rerained un-o7 r.d.reL. The latter de-
cision then proceaded to formulate the established New
York doctrine. This adjltdication togethur with that of Lake
Ontario R.R. ,o. v Nason ruortod in IG N.Y. 451 forms the
basis of the'3 law as it exists in New York to-day and will be
found cleprly in accord with the proposition that a oorpor-
ation may pecifically enforce an agreement to subscribe as
well as a -,resent bscrition.
It renain, to consv7,, r vory briefly the Ttestion of dax -
ages. io ad .ications .:ai-h wit'ilhold rrom the cOrpor-
ation the privilege of a coxllete perforuance of a technical
agreoennt to subscribe permit the recovery of such damages as
tie corporation I as sustained by a failure to perform. And
the measure of these damages is ardinatily the difference be-
tween tho iarket value of the stock and the price agreed on.
This conclusion was reached in
Xt. Sterling Coal Road Co. v Little, sup;ra.
Thrasher v Pike Co. R.R.Co., supra.
Quich v Lemon, surx ,a.
Lake Ontario R.R.ko. v Curtiss, supra.
But it is submitted with due deference to those authorities
that the ruling is based on a nisconception of the true and
fuidamental niature of a s oscription to co;?orate stock and
the lfirrpses it is intenlol to s c:serve.
1Tor where a nr-ber of Irdividivjs agreo tc valbscribe for
the stocX of a non-existent er*poration, the e.Aitre amount of
capital stock the conany will be authorized to issue is div-
ided into shares at a stated and fixed iluat in. Each mem-
ber Rttehe his signattre on the assim-ption that every other
Subscriber will be reqaired to forfeit t1,o Par value cf every
share of tcol l ass-s tc pirchpse: the precise contract
he himself has been required to make. He does not 0onteo-
Plate that one shall h'co qualifiod shareholder enjoying
the privileges and benofits incident thereto without 1,aYifl
for his stock the sane anount that has been required of him.
But such is the situation exactly, resulting from an
application of the ;raepasire of di.E:gcs to Thich reference has -
Jut been made. Let us suppose for illustration that one
has so subscribed for stock and later defaulted. The cor-
poration subsequently sells his stock for a price, we will
assume, below yar, and is then pernittod to recover from the
defaulting subscriber the deficiency when compared with the
contract -rice. The nrw s ~c2:iber is thus constituted a
qualified member of the corporation, paying lese for his
stock than was exacted from the others: but entitling him,
nevertheless, to the same rights and benefits accorded to all.
It is manifest that such a construction undermines the
fundamental character of the origibal subscriber's agreement,
requiretin him to contribute to the capital stock an amount
disProiortionato to tbo bonefits derived. The defaulting
Ubscri~ber agroo to I;ay the :ear value of the stock when a
Oall ObOUld be iuaro and it is that urerstaudi-nC uion Whiah
the fellow sifoscriters i-ainly rely. The action by the cor-
Poration should be to recover ti par value of the storck so
sold and not the rule of denCges ts advanced by some author-
ities.
To briefly sirznx, tzz o results of our investiration will
tend to establish more clearly in raind the conclusions reach-
ed. The assertion is ventured that a careful examination of
all the authorities will justify. a reliance upon the accuracy
of the following propositions:-
1. A present suf)scription is in the nature of a con-
tinuing offer to the corporation which offer rzay te accepted
by the corporation at any tine before revocation, and that
the agreement is not one anong the individual siboscribers.
. A corporation nay con7!;ell the performuance of an
agreement to subscribe as having been :&. for its benefit.
3. A parol subscriltion is a valid and binding contract.
4. In an action by a ccrporation upon a subscription
the recovery should be the -al valmu of the stoco. and not
28
domates as measured by tho diffornce betwoen the ia arhet
valUe and the contrarct -,rice of the stock.
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